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Abstract
Since World War II, the executive branch has dominated foreign policy and national
security decisions, expanding war powers well beyond the president’s constitutional
purview. Aided by a complicit Congress, the president has bypassed the legislator and
unilaterally prosecuted some of the United States’ bloodiest conflicts. Continuing this
tradition of executive overreach, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) on September 14, 2001, which ostensibly empowered the
president to pursue those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, namely al Qaeda and the
nations supporting them. However, the broadly-worded force authorization and equally
far-reaching legal interpretations by the executive branch turned the AUMF into a nearly
limitless authorization. Since its passage, the AUMF has provided the legal backstop for
the war in Afghanistan, drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere,
National Security Agency surveillance, and the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
Enabled by the AUMF, the “war on terror” has eroded civil liberties, allowed
extrajudicial killings, and transformed the conflict with al Qaeda war without end. In
order to end the destructive legacies of the war on terror and begin to reverse the trend of
executive overreach, Congress and the president should repeal the AUMF and update the
force authorization regime.
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Introduction:
On September 14, 2001, just days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, both houses of the United States Congress passed the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Terrorists, now known in shorthand as the AUMF, with only a
single vote against.1 The lone dissenter, Representative Barbara Lee from California’s
13th district, who was still a relatively junior representative at the time, voiced her deep
concern and trepidation over the proposed bill.2 Arguing for restraint, Lee urged, “There
must be some of us who say, let’s step back for a moment and think through the
implications of our actions today—let us more fully understand their consequences.” She
continued, “We cannot respond in a conventional manner. I do not want to see this spiral
out of control . . . If we rush to launch a counterattack, we run too great a risk that
women, children, and other non-combatants will be caught in the crossfire.”3 Lee then
closed her speech with an aphorism she had heard earlier in the day from priest Nathan
Baxter during a memorial service for the victims of the attack: “As we act, let us not
become the evil that we deplore.”4
The AUMF in its original form has remained intact and relatively uncontested for
over 12 years. John Bellinger III, close advisor to Condoleezza Rice and the Bush
Administration and critic of the legislation, said, “[The AUMF] is like a Christmas tree.
1

This paper will use the abbreviation “AUMF” to refer to the “Authorization for the Use of Military
Force,” Public Law 107-40, September 18, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>.
2
Gregory D. Johnsen, “60 Words and a War Without End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous
Sentence in U.S. History,” Buzzfeed, January 16, 2014, <http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60words-and-a-war-without-end-the-untold-story-of-the-most>.
3
Barbara Lee, “Rep. Barbara Lee’s Speech Opposing the Post 9-11 Use of Force Act,” Waging Peace,
September 14, 2011, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/09/14_lee-speech.htm>.
4
Ibid.

7

All sorts of things have been hung off of those 60 words.”5 Since its passage in 2001, the
AUMF has provided the legal underpinnings for the prosecution of the war in
Afghanistan, the detention of suspected enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, the drone
strike program in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, and the NSA surveillance program. 6
In a May 2013 speech to the National Defense University, President Obama cautioned
against “[continuing] to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional
armed conflicts between nation states,” and voiced his desire to “[engage] Congress and
the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”7
But President Obama failed to specify what an amended or entirely new AUMF would
look like, and debates in legal, political, and moral realms still persist as to whether the
U.S. government should repeal, replace, amend, or keep the current authorization.
This paper aims to frame the AUMF debate within the historical trend of the
consolidation of war powers in the executive branch. In the development of this gradual
power shift, the AUMF represents a bridge too far by establishing new heights of
executive overreach. In order to repel the steady march of the imperial presidency,
Congress should repeal the AUMF and establish a system of force authorizations that
engage Congress through statutory measures. Part I of this paper will analyze proExecutive and pro-Congress interpretations of war powers and the historical trend toward
the consolidation of warmaking authority in the executive branch. Part II will explain the
AUMF in the context of this historical trend and explain how this legislation has set new
5

Johnsen, “60 Words and a War Without End.”
All of these topics will be discussed at length throughout the paper.
7
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” National Defense
University, Washington, D.C., May 23,2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.
6
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precedents of executive war powers. Part III will explore arguments against the AUMF to
address the need for repeal. The final part of the paper will explore current proposals for
reform and offer a policy recommendation.
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Part I: Constitutional Interpretations of War Powers and Historical Trends
Constitutional War Powers of the Legislative & Executive Branches
While the AUMF represents a new level of executive overreach, the imbalance of
power in the branches of the U.S. government on matters of foreign policy and national
security has steadily increased throughout U.S. history, in spite of the original intent of
the Framers. The Founding Fathers sought to establish a balance of power and a system
of checks and balances in all realms of American politics, both domestic and
international. In foreign policy and national security issues, the Constitution authorizes
Congress to “declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”
“to raise and support Armies,” appropriate money, and to “provide and maintain a
Navy.”8 The Constitution also requires the President to act in certain capacities with the
“Advice and Consent” of two-thirds of the Senate.9 The President in turn serves as
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” At the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention, James Wilson praised the overlapping war powers and said,
“This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be
in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for
the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.”10 Given these
provisions and delegations of power, the Constitution, in principle, safeguards against an
executive acting unilaterally, risking the country’s soldiers, wealth, and interests abroad.

8

Constitution of the United States,
<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html>.
9
Ibid.
10
Bruce A. Ackerman et al., “Ronald V. Dellums v. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus
Curiae of Law Professors” (1991). Faculty Publications. Paper 751.
<http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/751>.
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Pro-Congress Interpretations
Though few disagree with the constitutional establishment of checks and balances
in some aspects of U.S. policymaking and government, many war powers scholars still
disagree on the Framers’ intention for the delegation of war powers between the
executive and legislative branches. Even the courts have remained generally silent in this
debate, “especially during wartime, when the consequences of a constitutional error are
potentially enormous.”11 “Pro-Congress” interpretations of war powers posit that the
president is obligated by law to obtain some type of formal authorization from Congress
before engaging in any significant military action.12 Looking at the original intent of the
Constitution, pro-Congress advocates contend that the Framers separated war powers for
fear that the president, “whose powers balloon unnaturally in wartime, has a dangerous
incentive to contrive and publicize bogus pretexts for war.”13 Therefore, pro-Congress
interpreters of the Constitution hope to check presidential war powers both before and
during hostilities.
Proponents of this interpretation do not always connect the congressional
authorization requirement to formal declarations of war; however, they do see an
authorization to use force as a necessary “mechanism for Congress to ‘constitutionally
manifest its understanding and approval for a presidential determination to make war.’”14
The President acts as Commander in Chief, but as former Virginia Senator Jim Webb

11

Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,”
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 7, (May 2005), 2051.
12
Ibid., 2057.
13
Stephen Holmes, “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic,” The Nation, April 13, 2006,
<http://www.thenation.com/article/john-yoos-tortured-logic>.
14
Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2057.
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points out, “only in the sense that he would be executing policies shepherded within the
boundaries of legislative powers.”15 This pro-Congress interpretation vests the power to
initiate war solely in Congress, leaving the President only two distinct powers:
conducting a congressionally authorized war and responding to sudden or surprise
attacks. These arguments maintain congressional supremacy in war powers and bring the
legislative branch into the foreign policy fold by requiring the branches to work in
tandem on national security issues.
Pro-Executive Interpretations
In the “pro-Executive” understanding of constitutional war powers, the president,
as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” has broad authority
and latitude to employ military force in response to threats, whether responsively or
preventively, to the national security and foreign interests of the United States.16 These
arguments place little emphasis on the necessity of congressional authorizations of force,
especially in times of emergency, which call for rapid military responses. Many proExecutive advocates point to the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787 as proof of
original pro-Executive intent, when the Framers of the Constitution substituted Congress’
power to “make war” for an ability to “declare war.”17 Debates during the convention
concluded that legislative processes may prove too slow to respond to sudden attacks, yet

15

Jim Webb, “Congressional Abdication,” The National Interest, (March/April 2013), 8.
Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them,” Harvard
Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 487, (2001), 490.
17
Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, “The Legality of the United States Participation in the
Defense of Vietnam,” The Yale Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 7, (Jun. 1966), 1101.
16
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many dissenters still warned against unilateral executive military action.18 Preeminent
pro-Executive scholar and co-author of the AUMF John Yoo has advocated for the
president’s “‘inherent executive power’ to decide on his own whether to ‘deploy military
force preemptively’” and has vigorously defended the “president’s ‘right’ to ‘start
wars.’”19 Yoo supports his pro-Executive claim with notable historical precedents and the
argument of national self-defense through retaliation or preemptive measures to repel
imminent attacks.
Consolidation of War Powers in the Executive:
a.) Presidential Action
While constitutional law scholars debated pro-Congress and pro-Executive
interpretations, presidents since World War II have charged ahead, consolidating power
by setting precedents and acting autonomously in the arenas of foreign policy and
national security. In a famous example of pro-Executive activism, a 1966 memorandum
from President Johnson’s State Department claimed:
Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in
which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain
positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization . . . The
Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to determine whether the
circumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential
consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that he should act
without formally consulting the Congress.20
Indeed, history corroborates Johnson’s memorandum, and the trend of executive
deployment of troops with or without congressional authorization has continued well into
18

Ibid., 1101.
Stuart Streichler, “Mad About Yoo, or, Why Worry about the Next Unconstitutional War?” Journal of
Law & Politics, Vol. 24, (Winter 2008), 93-94.
20
Office of the Legal Adviser, 1101.
19
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the 21st-century. In the early 1950s, President Truman prosecuted a war in Korea
involving 250,000 American troops and, later that same decade, President Eisenhower
sent 14,000 troops to Lebanon—all without congressional authorization.21 Not wanting to
weaken the presidency through legislative approval, President Truman both refused to
seek congressional authorization for his exploits in Korea and brushed aside
congressional overtures when an authorization was offered.22 In 1999, President Clinton,
also lacking congressional authorization, ordered military action in the Republic of
Yugoslavia and claimed that he took such actions “pursuant to [his] constitutional
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive.”23 The resulting hostilities implicated over 30,000 American troops and
roughly 800 U.S. aircraft, deploying over 23,000 bombs and missiles.24
Another notable example occurred in 2002, when the White House Counsel’s
Office under the Bush administration claimed that the president retained congressional
authorization to prosecute an invasion in Iraq from the joint resolution that authorized the
first Persian Gulf War back in 1991.25 At the time, a senior administration official
explained, “We don’t want to be in the legal position of asking Congress to authorize the
use of force when the president already has that full authority. We don’t want, in getting a
resolution, to have conceded that one was constitutionally necessary.”26 As a secondary
line of defense, the Bush administration issued a legal brief citing the president’s Article
21

Ibid., 1101.
Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate, (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 50.
23
Delahunty and Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority,” 504.
24
Ibid., 504.
25
Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, “Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote,” Washington Post,
August 26, 2002.
26
Ibid.
22
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II authority as legal justification to deploy armed forces to Iraq: “Irrespective of any
Congressional assent, the President has broad powers as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces under the Constitution that would justify the use of force in Iraq.”27
Offering two lines of legal justification, the Bush administration was resolute in its claim
to bypass Congress. Though Congress ultimately passed an authorization for the use of
force in Iraq in 2002, the fact that the Bush administration considered the approval of
Congress for an entirely different war from the one authorized 11 years prior as a
“concession” rather than a constitutional obligation showed a stunning circumvention of
congressional war powers.
This trend has continued well into the Obama administration. In 2011, President
Obama sidestepped Congress and ordered a military air campaign in Libya, causing many
journalists and critics to speculate that President Obama had violated the War Powers
Resolution.28 In a 38-page memorandum distributed to lawmakers, the White House
defended its “constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition” and claimed
that the President’s actions did not violate the War Powers Resolution “because U.S.
military operations [in Libya] are distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by
the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision.”29 However, this “constrained and
supporting role” cost the U.S. military nearly $1 billion, raising questions about the true

27

Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency, 2.
See for example Conor Friedersdorf, “Obama Fails to Justify the Legality of War in Libya,” The Atlantic,
June 16, 2011, and Charlie Savage, “War Powers Act Doesn’t Apply for Libya, Obama Says,” The New
York Times, June 15, 2011.
29
“White House Report on U.S. Actions in Libya,” June 15, 2011,
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/16/us/politics/20110616_POWERS_DOC.html?ref=politics
>.
28
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extent of the Obama administration’s intervention.30 Irrespective of whether or not the
Obama Administration violated the War Powers Resolution, the White House sent the
explanatory document after the fact and failed to engage Congress in meaningful
dialogue before commencing the intervention. Additionally, the Obama Administration
carried out the military intervention even though the United States did not face an
imminent attack or threat.
b.) Congressional Complicity
Bold presidential action did not occur in a vacuum. The consolidation of war
powers resulted from an energetic executive as well as a complicit Congress. At a 2013
conference at the Wilson Center on reasserting the role of Congress in war powers,
Senator Bob Corker lamented the fact that “what’s happened over time with Congress in
general is that we have no ownership whatsoever over the conflicts that exist.”31
Polarization in the legislative branch has adversely affected its control over the power to
initiate military action. In a general trend, legislators have pursued unachievable and
overly idealistic policy goals, capitalized on foreign policy issues for political gains, and
evaded political consequences in decision-making.32 Apart from declaring lofty grand
strategies for appearances for presidential hopefuls, Congress has shied away from the
important decisions, tending to place the responsibility and blame with the president.33 In
their book Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, authors

30

John Barry, “America’s Secret Libya War,” The Daily Beast, August 30, 2011 ,<
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/30/america-s-secret-libya-war-u-s-spent-1-billion-oncovert-ops-helping-nato.html>.
31
“AUMF: Reasserting the Role of Congress,” Woodrow Wilson Center, July 11, 2013, 4.
32
I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American
Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 130.
33
Ibid., 130.
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I.M. Destler et al chronicle this “irresponsibility” of Congress in the foreign policy arena
especially in the two decades following World War II, which marked the “golden years
for the foreign-policy Establishment and for the Executive Branch” and “years of
deference if not abstinence” for the legislative branch.34 Most notably, when President
Truman unilaterally sent troops to Korea, Congress sat on the sidelines. Satisfied to
receive briefings from deputy assistant secretaries of State, Congress simply acquiesced,
as they let President Truman carry out the fourth-bloodiest war in American history.35
Though the President has employed military force without the consent of
Congress, the majority of conflicts since the Korean War have occurred with formal
congressional authorization. Paradoxically, these congressional authorizations have
consolidated executive power even further, because, as Stephen Holmes points out in his
critical article of John Yoo called “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic,” “legislative complicity
has generally proved more useful to the President than to Congress.”36 In 1964, Congress
passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized the President to “take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression” and provided the legal foundation for the prosecution of
the Vietnam War.37 Compared to previous congressional authorizations of force in both
declared and undeclared wars, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, until its repeal in 1971,
was “arguably broader or at least more open-ended with respect to targets and purpose.”38
With the exception of two dissenting senators, including Senator Wayne Morse who
34

Ibid., 130.
Ibid., 130.
36
Holmes, “John Yoo’s Tortured Logic.”
37
“The Wars for Vietnam: The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964,” Vassar
College, accessed April 27, 2014, <http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc9.html>.
38
Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2076.
35
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warned against the “great mistake in subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the
United States,” the resolution passed easily.39 With its far-reaching implications, the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution perfectly illustrated Congress’ deference to the President in issues
of war and national security, whether the President consulted the legislative body or not.
These harsh criticisms of congressional deference in the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution are usually tempered with the apologetic claim that the force authorization led
to the War Powers Resolution, which ultimately curbed presidential discretion in
initiating war. In 1973, Congress passed the resolution and overrode a veto from
President Nixon. The legislation limited Presidential deployment of troops without
congressional authorization to sixty days. After its passage, members of Congress
trumpeted a great victory for the reclamation of war powers in the legislative branch.40
The first part of the War Powers Resolution claims that the law guarantees “that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”41 The landmark legislation did mark a
distinct line in the sand, at least rhetorically, for the expanding executive war powers.
However, a 2012 Congressional Research Service report on presidential compliance with
the War Powers Resolution concluded that the celebrated legislation did not have nearly
the intended effect. From 1975 through mid-September 2012, only one out of 136
submitted presidential reports actually triggered the time limit in section 4(a)(1) of the

39

“The Wars for Vietnam: The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964.”
Destler, Gelb, and Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, 134.
41
“War Powers,” United States Library of Congress, last updated February 28, 2014,
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>.
40
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War Powers Resolution.42 Though many hail the legislation as a great check on the
executive, presidential compliance has proved difficult to enforce.
Congressional deference, or “abdication” as former Senator Jim Webb calls it,
and executive overreach intensified once again after the September 11 attacks with the
“war on terror” and the passage of the AUMF. A part of the military establishment
himself as Secretary of the Navy, Senator Webb described the political landscape
immediately after September 11, 2001:
Powers quickly shifted to the presidency as the call went up for centralized decision
making in a traumatized nation where quick, decisive action was considered
necessary. It was considered politically dangerous and even unpatriotic to question
this shift . . . Members of Congress fell all over themselves to prove they were behind
the troops and behind the wars.43
This crisis-stricken environment gave birth to the new post-September 11 governance,
which bolstered the pro-Executive interpretation of war powers and exacerbated the
imbalance of power. The beginning of the new AUMF governance occurred in part
because of congressional abdication in the critical days after the September 11 attacks.
Despite initial pushback from a much broader White House AUMF proposal in the hours
following the attack, Congress passed the little deliberated force authorization with only
one dissenting vote from either house.
After the passage of the broadly worded 2001 AUMF, members of Congress
remained silent during the passage of the 2002 authorization for the use of force in Iraq.
Even though Congress had voted for the use of force, many claimed that the president

42

Richard F. Grimmett, “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years,” Congressional Research
Service, September 24, 2012, < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf>.
43
Webb, “Congressional Abdication,” 9.
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still held the power to decide whether or not to act on the authorization. After the vote,
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle commented, “Regardless of how one may have
voted on the resolution last night, I think there is an overwhelming consensus . . . that
while [war] may be necessary, we’re not there yet.”44 Despite Senator Daschle’s
insistence that the time had not yet come for war, once the President Bush deployed
troops, Congress played a marginal to absent role in the proceeding events. During some
of the most critical times of the war, the Congressional Record reveals almost no debate
of the military engagement. In The New Imperial Presidency, author Andrew Rudalevige
recounts his close reading of the Congressional Record during this important time:
The Senate spent most of mid-March debating the emotionally polarizing but
substantively limited question of partial-birth abortion procedures. The House of
Representatives had its official photograph taken, named a room after former
majority leader Richard Armey, and expressed its unanimous sense that fires in
nonresidential buildings and executions conducted by stoning were bad things.45
Congressional abdication came at a time when the United States could have benefitted
the most from thoughtful dialogue and engagement.
c.) Other Explanations
Several phenomena may explain the consolidation of executive war power and
congressional abdication. In the realms of waging war and maintaining national security,
the president enjoys a potent “first-mover advantage.” With this significant advantage,
the president may act without approval from Congress, after which “the burden lies on

44

Gene Healy, “Reclaiming the War Power,” in Cato Handbook For Congress: Policy Recommendations
for the 108th Congress, Cato Institute, 112.
45
Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency, 1.
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other institutions to force him to alter his policies.”46 This makes presidential military
actions difficult to challenge because Congress must prove that the president acted well
beyond any reasonable interpretation of congressional force authorizations. Challenging
the executive on this front becomes all the more difficult given the commonly held
conception that the president operates under much more informed circumstances in
matters of national security. Such an advantage is bolstered by the “rally ‘round the flag”
effect, in which the president gains momentum sometimes from a rise, albeit short-term,
in approval ratings after military exploits.47
With the advent of political parties, members of Congress grew even more likely
to toe the party line and follow the president’s lead.48 Partisanship continued to intensify,
and, as a result, members of Congress developed a much higher likelihood of voting
along party lines. In a National Journal study completed in 2011, every Senate Democrat
amassed a voting record more liberal than every State Republican and vice versa.49 These
phenomena can allow exaggerated or even false claims of threats facing the United
States, as the members of Congress aligned with the president in power may question war
claims less. Many have speculated that the Johnson Administration intentionally
misrepresented the events of the Gulf of Tonkin in order to catalyze action.50 Similar
debates raged over “discredited intelligence” which had served as the basis for the war in
46

Mark Tushnet, “Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118,
No. 8, (Jun., 2005), 2677.
47
Ibid., 2678.
48
In Senator Webb’s article, he remarks that “party loyalties over a range of contentious policy decisions
became so strong that it often seemed we were mimicking the British parliamentary system, with members
of Congress lining up behind the president as if he were a prime minister.” See Webb, “Congressional
Authorization,” 9.
49
Ronald Brownstein, “Pulling Apart,” The National Journal, February 24, 2011,
<http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/congress-hits-new-peak-in-polarization-20110224>.
50
Bradley and Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization, 2075.
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Iraq.51 These possible explanations either enabled or aided the energetic administrations
and deferential congressional classes since WWII. This backdrop set the stage for the
kneejerk authorization penned after the terrorist attacks on September 11. Continuing the
progression of executive overreach, the AUMF has pushed the executive war powers
boundaries even further.

51

Elisabeth Bumiller, “Records Show Doubts on ’64 Vietnam Crisis,” The New York Times, July 14, 2010,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/asia/15vietnam.html?_r=2&>.
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Part II: AUMF as a Bridge Too Far

Although the AUMF continues the trend toward the consolidation of warmaking
authority in the executive branch, the law also represents a new level of executive
overreach. In their survey of congressional authorizations of the use of force throughout
American history, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith distinguish between limited and broad authorizations of
force and use five components in their analysis: “(1) the authorized military resources;
(2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use
of force; and (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force.”52 Adding in
the geographical scope of the authorization, all of these analytical components, in part or
in whole, show the AUMF as atypically broad both in how Congress wrote the law and
how the president has subsequently interpreted it.
A.) Targets
One of the most contentious issues surrounding the war on terror and the AUMF
is the methodology, or lack thereof, used for classifying and targeting enemy combatants.
Although many disagree as to whether those who passed the AUMF intentionally gave
the president broad discretion, many critics and observers agree that the AUMF has been
used to legally justify the lethal targeting of a widening array of enemies. According to
Bradley and Goldsmith’s survey of authorizations, historically speaking “all of the
authorizations restrict targets, either expressly (as in the Quasi-War statutes’ restrictions
relating to the seizure of certain naval vessels), implicitly (based on the identified enemy
52
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and stated purposes of the authorization), or both.”53 With the AUMF, however, the
restriction of targets exists in a grey area. The staunchest critics of the AUMF see the
issue of targeting as the most nefarious outcome of the legislation. In “After the AUMF,”
Jennifer Daskal and Stephen Vladeck summarize this fear and warn, “The more that the
AUMF is used to justify the use of military force against those with no connection to the
September 11 . . . the more it becomes an essentially limitless authorization, allowing the
President to use force as a matter of first resort.”54
These debates over terrorist targets began at the inception of the AUMF. On
September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a mourning nation:
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports
them . . . Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated . . . And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you
are with us, or you are with the terrorists.55
Statements such as this one reflect the Bush Administration’s broad interpretation from
the outset of the scope of targets authorized by the AUMF. However, this was not the
intention of Congress. Despite the Bush Administration’s initial efforts for broad
discretion in terrorist targeting during the drafting of the bill, many members of Congress
saw the AUMF as distinct from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution because the new
legislation had authorized force only against a specific enemy.56 In a House debate over
the proposed AUMF, Representative Jackson of Illinois claimed, “I am not voting ‘Yes’
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on September 14, 2001 for an open-ended Tonkin Gulf-type Resolution . . . I’m not
willing to give President Bush carte blanche authority to fight terrorism.” He then
cautioned, “Recently President Bush said that the United States ‘will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbored them.’ But we
must make distinctions.”57
In the view of Representative Jackson and numerous other members of Congress,
the AUMF did not constitute a blank check force authorization, but rather a restricted
authorization to exercise military action against only “those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”58 In his
article “The Wrong War,” Grenville Byford makes an important distinction by separating
wars fought against “proper nouns (Germany, say),” from the generally less successful
“wars against common nouns (poverty, crime, drugs).”59 Based on this distinction, a
discrepancy seems to exist between the common noun enemy of the “war on terror” and
the proper noun targets of the AUMF from the view of Congress. In July 2013, the
Congressional Research Service drafted a background brief on the AUMF and concluded
that the legislation is considered groundbreaking because it “(1) empowered the President
to target non-state actors, even to the individual level, as well as states, and (2) did not
specify which states and non-state actors were included under the authorization.”60

57

“Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Congress, First Session,” Congressional Record, Vol. 147, No.
120, September 14, 2001, H5675, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-09-14/pdf/CREC-2001-0914-house.pdf >.
58
Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 115.; “Authorization for the Use of Military Force.”
59
Grenville Byford. “The Wrong War,” Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2002), 34.
60
Matthew Weed, “The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Background in Brief,”
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, July 10, 2013, 1.

25

While recognizing these new precedents, Bradley and Goldsmith make an
important observation of the AUMF, which differs from past authorizations and war
declarations. The authors suggest that the AUMF allows for broader interpretation of
targets because of two provisions. By allowing the President to use military action against
“those nations, organizations, or persons he determines have the requisite nexus with the
September 11 attacks,” the AUMF “describes rather than names the enemies that are the
objects of the use of force.”61 Secondly, Bradley and Goldsmith present the possibility
that the “he determines” provision intentionally grants the President autonomy. Because
of these significant provisions, the authors categorize the AUMF as one of the broadest
authorizations in American history with regard to enemy targets, whether intended or not.
Although some members of Congress viewed the requirement of targets to have
some connection to those responsible for the September 11 attacks as a viable legal
limitation, others viewed this nexus requirement as a feeble, inadequate safeguard.
Eleanor Holmes Norton, a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives from the
District of Columbia, warned during AUMF deliberations that the September 11
reference was only a “slim anchor,” and in reality the text of the legislation “allows war
against any and all prospective persons and entities.”62 The Bush and Obama
Administrations’ interpretations of the AUMF to include “associated forces” of al Qaeda
further reduced Norton’s precarious “slim anchor.” In May 2013 at the National Defense
University, President Obama declared the United States to be at war with “al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and their associated forces.”63 When asked whether groups or individuals who
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may have emerged after September 11 or with no connection with the attacks on
September 11 could be legally covered under the current AUMF, Acting General Counsel
of the Department of Defense Robert Taylor unequivocally replied, “If they become an
associated force with al Qaeda, then they have joined with the organization that was
responsible for those September 11 attacks and we believe they are fully covered by the
AUMF.”64 By declaring war against both a common noun and associated forces, the
nexus requirement faded, and the potential targets covered under the AUMF expanded.
B.) Purpose of the Use of Force
The broadening of targets in a military conflict to associated forces and beyond
inherently changes the purpose of the use of force. Using the AUMF to justify the pursuit
of targets with no connection to al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks turns the authorization into
something else entirely. The notion of associated forces and co-belligerents is not
historically unprecedented. In World War II, the United States was at war with Germany,
Italy, Japan, and their co-belligerents; however, in that conflict, Congress subsequently
declared war against the co-belligerents. By contrast, the executive branch has added cobelligerents and associated forces into the AUMF without additional congressional
authorization.65 The AUMF authorized force against al Qaeda in order to prevent future
acts of terrorism “by such nations, organizations or persons.” The broader interpretation
possibly changes the purpose to prevent any future acts of terrorism by any organization.
In a speech at the Oxford Union in late 2012, U.S. Department of Defense
General Counsel Jeh Johnson defined associated forces as “having two characteristics:
64
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(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a
co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.”66 This idea of associated forces represents a significant legal argument to
justify killing combatants not explicitly associated with al Qaeda. As Daskal and Vladeck
point out:
All three branches of the U.S. government have agreed that anyone who is a member
of al Qaeda or the Taliban can be detained without charge, and also, according to the
views of the past two administrations, subject to lethal force in appropriate
circumstances.67
Once an enemy combatant or organization acquires the label of “associated force,” the
U.S. government may essentially employ limitless force against them, similarly to al
Qaeda itself. Because the past two administrations have read associated forces into the
AUMF, determining the scope of these al Qaeda offshoots has become a heated debate in
executive overreach.
These debates resulted in the May 2013 Senate Committee on Armed Services
hearing on the AUMF. During Senator Angus King’s opening remarks at the hearing, the
Senator called the proceedings “astoundingly disturbing” and accused the representatives
from the Pentagon of having “essentially rewritten the Constitution.”68 His main concern
surrounded the concept of associated forces, and he remarked:
This authorization, the AUMF, is very limited, and you keep using the term
‘associated forces.’ You used it 13 times in your statement. That is not in the
AUMF. And you said at one point it suits us very well. I assume it does suit you
very well because you are reading it to cover everything and anything. 69
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Senator King’s fear, and the fear of others, holds that the executive branch might
shoehorn any new or emerging threats into this associated forces category. Because of the
mutable, amorphous nature of al Qaeda and related organizations, the president and the
Pentagon enjoy a certain leeway in the categorization of these groups. In the May 2013
Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on the AUMF, Assistant Secretary
Sheehan testified that “these groups . . . have very murky membership and they also have
murky alliances and shifting alliances,” and “they change their name and they lie and
obfuscate their activities.”70 Pentagon and White House officials constantly leave the
definition of associated forces open-ended and paint the network as a complex web of
groups, which makes determining the nexus requirement for a lawful military strike
incredibly difficult. Given the stated difficulty of designating groups as associated forces
and the purported care in determining these designations, such assessments might seem
like high-level, high-sensitivity deliberations. Yet, Assistant Secretary Sheehan reported
that lower level officials in the Pentagon make these designations prior to presidential
approval for the use of lethal force.71
This concern of shoehorning new, disjointed threats is compounded by the fact
that the U.S. Department of Defense keeps the list of associated forces secret.72 Warning
that such a public revelation would cause “serious damage to national security,” a
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spokesman for the Department of Defense explained the Pentagon’s rationale in keeping
the list classified: “Because elements that might be considered ‘associated forces’ can
build credibility by being listed as such by the United States, we have classified the list.”
He went on, “We cannot afford to inflate these organizations that rely on violent
extremist ideology to strengthen their ranks.”73 This justification stands on shaky ground,
because the Pentagon has failed to give concrete evidence to back up this claim. In his
“Lawfare Blog,” Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith brands the “soft criterion” of the
inflation rationale as “weak,” because the acknowledgement of the U.S. government
would likely have little bearing on already well-known groups.74 Additionally, the
Department of Defense’s official acknowledgement of al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), and elements of al Shabaab seems to run counter to this argument, as
the Pentagon does not sufficiently explain why some groups would be inflated by
acknowledgement rather than others.75 Such lack of transparency seems self-serving for
the president, who would want to escape scrutiny from controversial drone strikes and
other actions.76
These varied legal interpretations of associated forces have led many to caution
that the AUMF has not significantly legally limited executive discretion of enemy targets
and the purpose of the authorization. In an article called “60 Words and a War Without
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End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History,” Gregory D.
Johnsen reported on the history of the AUMF and the expansion of enemy targets:
Several of the lawyers I talked to, officials from both the Bush and Obama
Administrations spoke eloquently and at great length about the limits of the
AUMF and being constrained by the law. And maybe that is true. But none of
them were able to point to a case in which the U.S. knew of a terrorist but
couldn’t target him because it lacked the legal authority. Each time the president
wanted to kill someone, his lawyers found the authority embedded somewhere in
those 60 words.77
Similarly, in a 2013 Senate hearing on the future of the AUMF, Senator Jim Inhofe
remarked that in 10 years of briefings with members of the U.S. military on operations
against al Qaeda and their affiliates, he had never once heard “that they lacked the legal
authority to conduct their missions.”78 Senator Inhofe then asked Assistant Secretary for
Special Operations Michael Sheehan if he had ever encountered a situation in which the
special operations community “did not have sufficient legal authorization to prosecute the
war,” to which Assistant Secretary Sheehan responded, “I have not yet once found that
we did not have enough legal authority within the Department of Defense to prosecute
[the war].”79 While this may show a successful vetting process in the Department of
Defense, the lack of legal limitations may also display the absence of significant
constraints on enemy targets.
Enemy targeting began a new chapter when the Obama administration carried out
a targeted killing operation against an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, in Yemen in

77

Johnsen, “60 Words and a War Without End.”
“Hearing to Receive Testimony,” 11.
79
Ibid., 11.
78

31

2011.80 In addition to eliminating enemy combatants with tenuous ties to al Qaeda, the
Obama administration invoked the AUMF to kill its own citizen, establishing a new legal
precedent. However, the White House did not acknowledge these killings until May
2013, when Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the U.S. military had killed four American citizens since 2009.81
In response to criticisms and fears of extrajudicial killings, the executive branch
rolled out a number of interpretations and clarifications on the AUMF and drone strikes.
Though these white papers, fact sheets, and speeches dealt in a number of hypotheticals,
the interpretations within showed new heights of executive power. In November 2011,
the Department of Justice issued a white paper plainly stating that “were the target of a
lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and the
Fourth Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal
operation.” A 2013 White House fact sheet corroborated this statement, noting that the
Department of Justice would conduct “additional legal analysis” to ensure constitutional
compliance. At face value, this policy may seem consistent with the domestic judicial
process. However, as Attorney General Eric Holder clarified in a speech, the Obama
administration has interpreted “due process” and “judicial process” quite differently.82
According to Holder, civilian and military officials in the executive branch may carry out

80

Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlake in
Yemen,” The New York Times, September 30, 2011,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html>.
81
Pete Yost, “Four American Citizens Killed in Drone Strikes Since 2009: Eric Holder,” The Huffington
Post, May 22, 2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/22/american-citizens-dronestrikes_n_3321950.html>.
82
Eric H. Holder, Jr., “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,”
March 5, 2012, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>.

32

due process solely within the executive branch and use lethal force against a U.S. citizen
without judicial approval.83
C.) Geographical Scope
With the new level of discretion in enemy targeting comes an unprecedented,
widening geographical region where the U.S. military carries out its operations. In his
opening remarks at the May 2013 Senate hearing on the AUMF, Senator John McCain
demonstrated his disbelief at the evolution of the legislation: “None of us, not one who
voted for the AUMF, could have envisioned we were about to give future Presidents the
authority to fight terrorism as far flung as Yemen and Somalia.”84 According to the two
Pentagon officials, under the AUMF, the President would have the domestic authority to
put boots on the ground in both Yemen and the Congo, because the battlefield exists
“from Boston to the FATA.”85 This was not the first time the White House made this
claim. A few years prior to the hearing in 2011, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism John O. Brennan proclaimed in a speech, “The United
States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being
restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.”86 These statements marked a
serious departure from the United States’ previous armed conflicts. Some representatives
cautioned against the undefined battlefield parameters as early as the initial
Congressional debates surrounding the AUMF on September 14, 2001. Representative
Jesse Jackson, Jr. of Illinois warned, “As written, the resolution could be interpreted, if
83
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read literally, to give the President the authority to deploy or use our armed forces
domestically.”87 Indeed, in a letter to Senator Rand Paul, Attorney General Eric Holder
confirmed that hypothetically, in an “extraordinary circumstance,” the President would be
authorized to carry out a drone strike against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil.88
Though Representative Jackson’s fears have not been realized, an October 2013
raid on a coastal Somali city showcased the long reach of U.S. military operations. In an
official statement days later, the Pentagon Press Secretary claimed that the operation had
taken place “under legal authorities granted to the Department of Defense by the
Authorization to Use Military Force (2001) against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”89
In a similar statement the day before, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel declared that the
United States military would pursue terrorists “no matter where they hide.”90 Delivering
on this threat, the Bush and Obama administrations have invoked the AUMF to engage in
military actions in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia since the passage of the AUMF.91 In both practice
and posturing, the Pentagon and the President have given no geographic limitation to the
war on terror.
D.) Military Resources and Methods of Force
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Indeterminate battlefields have coincided with unprecedented tactics and methods
of waging war since the passing of the AUMF in 2001. Bolstered by the AUMF’s
provision for the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force,” the in addition to
an explosion of military resources and technology has allowed the president to further
consolidate war powers in the executive branch. In terms of military expenditures, the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, taken together, cost between $4 and $6 trillion and
counting, making the post-9/11 military conflicts the most expensive in United States
history.92
In his article “The True Forever War,” Council on Foreign Relations Fellow
Micah Zenko catalogued the military technology evolution and how this development has
afforded the president significant autonomy as well as freedom from scrutiny. On
September 11, 2001, the United States laid claim to an arsenal of 167 drones, with only a
“handful” carrying weapons; 12 years later, in December 2013, the Pentagon and CIA
laid claim to an estimated 11,000 drones, hundreds of which are considered “armedcapable.”93 Initially developed to find one man, Osama bin Laden, the drone program
“has now been used an estimated 462 times to kill an estimated 3,600 suspected terrorists,
militants, and civilians in countries with which the United States is not formally at
war.”94 Similarly, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has more than
doubled its size and budget since 9/11.95 The growth of rapidly expanding cyber
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capabilities is even more difficult to estimate, given the fact that “the strategic guidance
and supporting doctrine . . . remains secret—or more likely unresolved.” 96 And, as Zenko
points out, size as well as the relative ease to deploy these methods have risen
dramatically. These low-cost, low-risk, and, most notably, low-visibility methods have
permitted the White House and the Pentagon unparalleled war powers.
These new wartime methods are not limited to uses of lethal force. By invoking
the AUMF provisions to “use all necessary and appropriate force” and to “prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States,” as well as reaffirming the
inherent power of commander in chief, the Bush and Obama administrations have acted
with significant latitude in non-lethal activities, such as surveillance and detention even
in the face of contradictory legislation. In 2006, the New York Times reported that the
National Security Agency (NSA) had been carrying out a robust surveillance program on
American citizens, all in complete disregard of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) warrant requirements.97 In a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the subject of
the constitutionality of the NSA surveillance program, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales vehemently defended the program, arguing that the president acted “with
authority provided both by the Constitution and by statute.”98 In addition to invoking the
oft-cited commander in chief and chief executive authorities of the president, Attorney
General Gonzales called attention to a provision in the FISA accords, which prohibit
government electronic surveillance “except as authorized by statute.” Congress passed
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such a statute, Gonzales argued, in 2001 with the AUMF, which authorizes the president
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against al Qaeda.”99 His reasoning, and indeed
the reasoning of the Bush administration, followed that if lethal force could be
authorized, then certainly electronic surveillance would fall well within that extreme.
Attorney General Gonzales’ statements on NSA surveillance were subjected to
serious debate. In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Yale Law scholar
Harold Koh chastised the Bush Administration for implementing the NSA surveillance
program and acting beyond its constitutional bounds. Citing the Fourth Amendment,
which requires government surveillance to be “reasonable, supported except in
emergency situations by warrants issued by courts, and based upon specific probable
cause,” Koh accused the NSA surveillance program of violating the constitution on all
three fronts.100 By relying on the AUMF as justification for warrantless surveillance, Koh
argued that the executive had grabbed even more power and rendered Congress a
“pointless rubberstamp.”101 In perhaps a testament to the AUMF as a new level of
executive power, Koh pointed out the fact that, since the passing of FISA in 1978, no
other administration had violated the surveillance legislation.102 Only with the AUMF did
the Bush Administration feel it had the legal authority, along with the motivation, to
violate FISA and conduct warrantless surveillance. In what looked ostensibly as a
drawdown of executive power, Attorney General Gonzales informed Congress via letter
that the Terrorist Surveillance Program would not be renewed, and any future
99
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surveillance would “now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.”103 However, as The Guardian and the The Washington Post revealed
in June 2013, the program had simply been replaced by a new, even more robust
surveillance program called PRISM.104
The detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba represents another
area where the AUMF enabled a bourgeoning executive power. Roughly eight hundred
prisoners have been detained at Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp since its opening in
2002.105 From its inception, the Guantanamo detention facility aimed to detain terrorism
suspects outside of the reach of U.S. laws and courts, and potentially beyond the scrutiny
of other federal branches.106 Like most of its actions in the “war on terror,” the executive
branch has cited the AUMF and the international laws of war to legally justify the
detentions at Guantanamo Bay.107 To be sure, the Guantanamo detention facility has been
subjected to significant political scrutiny and legal challenges during its life span.108 And,
like other controversial actions by the executive branch, the Obama administration has
promised efforts to scale back and even end the detention program. However, despite
President Obama’s May 2013 speech where he voiced his “commitment to closing
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Guantanamo,” the controversial detention facility remained open through the end of the
year and on into the next.109
E.) Timing and Procedural Restrictions
In terms of timing and procedural restrictions, the AUMF is more typical of other
authorizations for the simple reason that congressional force authorizations usually do not
restrict timing. Force authorizations implicitly continue to hold until the United States
defeats the stated enemy.110 In his majority opinion in the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush,
Justice Kennedy explained that “because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of
limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers
undefined.”111 Understandably, like past authorizations, Congress failed to provide a
“sunset clause” or time limitation in the 2001 AUMF. The AUMF’s mandate, like others,
implicitly ends with the end of the conflict or “cessation of active hostilities” in the words
of the “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War” with al Qaeda
and its associated forces.112 Both supporters of presidential latitude and those seeking to
curb executive power accept the legal justification that the war powers remain in place
until “the enemy is declared, by an action of the political branches, to have been
defeated.”113 However, because of the expanding scope of targets subsumed under al
Qaeda and its associated forces and the amorphous nature of the al Qaeda threat, the
implicit time limit defined by defeat of the enemy becomes harder to determine. As
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evidence of these difficulties, the war in Afghanistan is already the United States’ longest
major military conflict.114 Although the AUMF’s lack of time restrictions may seem in
line with past authorizations, the open-endedness of the enemies does not lend itself to a
clearly defined “cessation of active hostilities.” In all aspects of force authorizations, the
AUMF has allowed the president to push the boundaries of executive war powers further
than ever historically possible.
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Part III: The Need for Repeal
Arguments for Keeping the AUMF
The AUMF has enabled an unprecedented level of power in the executive branch,
but that fact alone does not sufficiently provide a basis for a repeal or replacement of the
current legislation. Some proponents of the AUMF not only defend the constitutionality
of the legislation but also praise the trend toward consolidation of power in order to
appropriately address the atypical threat presented by terrorism. In a “Statement of
Administration Policy” released in November 2011, the Obama administration claimed
that “the authorities granted by the AUMF . . . are essential to our ability to protect the
American people from the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces, and have
enabled us to confront the full range of threats this country faces from those organizations
and individuals.”115 The statement from the White House reflects the common refrain of
AUMF supporters that the U.S. military can only properly face the threat posed by al
Qaeda and its associated forces with an intentionally broad mandate. Recognition of the
abnormality of the conflict occurred at the AUMF’s inception. During the House debates
on September 14, 2001, even Representative Barbara Lee, the sole dissenting vote against
the AUMF, said, “We are not dealing with a conventional war. We cannot respond in a
conventional manner.”116
Along this line of argument, only an ambiguous AUMF allowing for broad
interpretation could allow the U.S. military to address the “full range” of threats posed by
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al Qaeda and its associated forces. At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in 2013
Mr. Taylor reminded Congress that “the enemy in this conflict has not confined itself to
the geographic boundaries of any one country” in this “unconventional war.”117 And, in
dealing with this shifting threat, Assistant Secretary Sheehan assured Congress that the
current AUMF worked and continues to work adequately:
I think the AUMF as currently structured works very well for us. So I guess we
would be concerned that any change might restrict our combatant commanders
from conducting their operations they have in the past. So right now, we are
comfortable. And I think, Senator Inhofe said if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. I would
subscribe to that policy.118
After the assassination of Osama bin Laden, many supporters of the broadly interpreted
AUMF felt affirmed in their methods. A few days after the raid, John Yoo wrote in the
National Review that, while the “majority of the credit for the operation that killed Osama
bin Laden goes to the Obama administration,” “it is also a vindication of the Bush
administration’s terrorism policies and shows that success comes from continuing those
policies.”119 The “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mentality has provided a solid foundation
for proponents of the AUMF.
Other arguments against changing the current AUMF revolve around the idea of
presidential and military flexibility in addressing the rapidly changing threat of terrorism
117

“Hearing to Receive Testimony,” 7.
Ibid., 17.
119
Yoo went on to reference and commend the enhanced interrogation techniques that led to the
identification of bin Laden’s courier, who then led U.S. intelligence analysts to bin Laden. These enhanced
interrogation techniques have been legally propped up by the post-9/11 governance of the AUMF. John
Yoo, “Bin Laden, No More,” The National Review, May 2, 2011, <
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/266271/bin-laden-no-more-nro-symposium/page/0/5>.
Others, however, have minimized the importance of the role of enhanced interrogation techniques, which
some allege to be torture, in the killing of Osama bin Laden. For a discussion on the value of enhanced
interrogation or torture, see Scott Shane and Charlie Savage, “Bin Laden Raid Revives Debate on Value of
Torture,” The New York Times, May 3, 2011, <
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/us/politics/04torture.html?_r=0>.
118

42

in general, not just al Qaeda and its associated forces. These proponents caution against
the gridlock that may occur in Congress over wartime decisions that require rapid
resolution, such as an emerging terrorist organization with no connection to al Qaeda.
Even the Framers considered this potential snare of allowing Congress full wartime
authority. In their view, the House of Representatives could prove dilatory in times of
war because of its unwieldy size and infrequent meetings.120 Warnings of increased
polarization and factionalism culminated in the 112th Congress earning the dubious
distinction of the least productive Congress of all time.121 The recent failures of the
appropriately dubbed “do nothing” Congress have casted doubts over Congress’
capability to make real-time decisions in high-pressure war situations.
Legal and Ethical Arguments for Changing the AUMF
After 13 years of an untouched AUMF and a drastically changed threat landscape,
this “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mentality is becoming harder to legally and
ideologically justify. Arguments for keeping the AUMF often come from a purely
national security perspective. Critics of the AUMF frame the debate in much broader
terms, citing the need to restore the rule of law and America’s reputation abroad in
addition to national security concerns of securing new force authorizations to cover
threats with no connection to al Qaeda. At its core, much of the debate over the AUMF
and the delegation of constitutional war powers boils down to defining Justice Jackson’s
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“equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”122 In a statement before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 2008, Harold Koh raised the stakes even higher when he
argued, “The Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’ has done serious and extensive
damage to civil liberties and the rule of law in the name of national security.”123 In this
argument against the AUMF, the legal and ethical are intertwined. Generally speaking,
this argument holds that the new heights of executive overreach enabled by the AUMF
and its subsequent legal interpretations have eroded civil liberties and the rule of law.124
Only by maintaining the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
even in the arena of war powers, can the U.S. government uphold these American ideals.
Pitfalls of a Perpetual State of War
Another argument against the AUMF involves an understanding of the law during
times of war and peace. According to the Congressional Research Service, declarations of
war automatically “trigger many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers
on the President,” as opposed to authorizations, which trigger no such standby statutory
authorities.125 Despite the lack of precedent, the executive branch has continuously
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argued that the AUMF sufficiently provides a “statutory exception.”126 Likening the force
authorization to a war declaration and the accompanying wartime atmosphere, the Bush
and Obama administrations perpetuated a crisis paradigm in which energetic Executive
action is both justified and necessary. As long as the war with al Qaeda and its associated
forces rages on, the reach of the executive branch, backed by the intact authorization, will
and should continue expanding.
AUMF advocates, such as Jeh Johnson, do acknowledge the existence of a
“tipping point” at which many of the al Qaeda leadership have been killed or captured,
and the group no longer poses a real threat against the United States.127 However,
determining this “tipping point” has been the subject of significant debate. In his
February 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama called core al Qaeda a
“shadow of its former self,” yet mentioned the emergence and evolution of al Qaeda’s
affiliates.128 Despite reducing al Qaeda to a mere “shadow,” Assistant Secretary Sheehan
lamented that al Qaeda’s tipping point “unfortunately is a long way off” based on the
group’s “organizational resiliency.”129 These discrepancies fuel fears of a perpetual state
of war allowing for the open-ended AUMF to ascribe unchecked presidential war powers
indefinitely.
The difficulty in ascertaining and declaring the end of the conflict with al Qaeda,
and therefore the end of the AUMF’s mandate, has both political and technical
dimensions. For all three branches of the federal government, “pinpointing the ‘end’ of
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such a nebulous conflict” is “fraught with political risk.”130 Declaring an end to the
conflict inevitably raises hard-to-answer questions of victory, defeat, cost, and intent.
Additionally, declaring an end to the conflict may imply that the United States no longer
faces terrorist threats to its national security. Such a statement would fly in the face of
intelligence on new and emerging terrorist threats and would open a politician up to harsh
criticisms from more hawkish members of Congress.
But even beyond the political difficulties, the nature of the threat posed by al
Qaeda does not lend itself to easy analysis. In his article, “The End of al Qaeda?
Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror,” Adam Klein discusses the complexities
of determining an end to the AUMF’s conflict, arguing that “a binary, on/off model of
when and how a war on terrorism ends under law does not adequately reflect the
multifaceted nature of the overall al Qaeda threat to the United States.”131 With its many
offshoots, affiliates, and associations, the United States cannot wage a war against one
unified enemy but rather multiple, sometimes loosely connected enemies. Some groups
may use the al Qaeda label for convenience, and other groups may have a similar Salafist
and “anti-Western” agenda but no official ties to al Qaeda. In the war with al Qaeda,
“there is no physical territory to conquer, no clear leadership structure to topple, no
Reichstag over which to fly a foreign flag.”132 The defeat of one branch of al Qaeda, or
even the assassination of Osama bin Laden, does not always mean definitive victory.
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Because of this political and technical difficulty to determine or declare an end to the
conflict, the AUMF’s mandate continues.
The difficulty in determining a cessation of hostilities has led some to declare the
current conflict as the “forever war” or the “war without end.”133134 The pitfalls and
dangers of a forever war are manifold. In his testimony in May 2013 to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth explained
the importance of the war and peace distinction:
When it comes to our most basic rights, there is probably no more important
distinction than the line between peace and war. In peacetime, the government can
use lethal force only if necessary to stop an imminent threat to life, and it can
detain only after according full due process. But in wartime, the government can
kill combatants on the battlefield, and it has greatly enhanced power to detain
people without charge or trial. So, safeguarding the right to life and liberty
depends in important part on ensuring that the government is not operating by
wartime rules when it should be abiding by peacetime rules.135
Given the fact that the “battlefield” in the war with al Qaeda and its associated forces
could be anywhere, the “forever war” becomes all the more troubling. In terms of
detention without charge or trial, the Supreme Court upheld that the AUMF had
“implicitly authorized” the President’s right to detain “enemy combatants” during war in
its 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.136And in 2012, President Obama signed the
National Defense Authorization Act, which included section 1021 which called for
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“affirmation of authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered
persons pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force.”137
Through the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi and the Executive branch’s
interpretations of the authorization, the AUMF and the war on terror have become locked
in a vicious cycle. As U.S. military operations diminish core al Qaeda, new threats, often
deemed affiliates or associated forces, emerge. The President then invokes the AUMF to
pursue the new threats, thereby justifying the need for the AUMF in the first place. In this
forever war the executive branch has put forth a new “crisis paradigm” without a time
limit.138 Despite the perpetuation of the conflict, statements from White House officials
reflect at least some recognition of the need to end the conflict. While still arguing for the
need to continue the conflict at present, Jeh Johnson echoed Kenneth Roth’s sentiments
on war and said, “‘War’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of
affairs . . . War violates the natural order of things . . . In its 12th year, we must not accept
the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the ‘new normal.’”139 And, during his
remarks at the National Defense University in May 2013, President Obama pithily stated,
“This war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our
democracy demands.”140 Actions, however, have not followed these remarks, and the
conflict, coupled with ever-expanding executive war powers, continues.
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Part IV: Policy Options for the AUMF

With no end to the conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces in sight, a
significant first step in curbing the slow creep of executive power must involve repealing
the AUMF and updating the authorization regime. This is not a novel suggestion. The
AUMF has drawn the ire of politicians from the left and the right, as well as across the
political spectrum in the media. With each new controversial news piece on the “war on
terror,” the media releases a salvo of op-ed pieces demanding the repeal of the broad
congressional authorization. The New York Times published a notable editorial in March
2013 calling for the immediate repeal of the AUMF.141 Numerous other op-eds have
echoed the call from The New York Times, and think tanks such as the Hoover Institute
and Wilson Center have provided frameworks for a repealing the AUMF or drafting a
new one. In Congress, legislators have proposed bills to diminish or repeal the force
authorization.142 Even President Obama himself expressed his desire to “refine, and
ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”143
In spite of all of the calls for reform, the AUMF remains firmly in place. In order
to begin to reverse the destructive trend of executive overreach, Congress must repeal the
AUMF and, in partnership with the executive branch, pursue a series of comprehensive
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reforms to “update” the AUMF. The two branches should work together to tie these
reforms to the areas where the AUMF has unduly expanded executive power: enemy
targets, purpose of the conflict, geographical scope, military resources and methods, and
timing and procedural restrictions.
Criteria for Policy Options
In considering the merits and drawbacks of a number of policy options relating to
AUMF reform, or maintenance of the status quo, policymakers should consider three
criteria: political feasibility, addressing threats to national security, and maintaining
national interest, each with equally weighted importance. Whether the reform originates
in the executive, judicial, or legislative branch, policymakers should carefully assess the
political possibility of such a proposal succeeding. No matter how valuable the proposal
may appear on other fronts, if the proposal has little political feasibility, then the law
simply will not pass, especially in the current polarized climate of the “do nothing”
Congress. Given the diverse range of vested interests of the various actors in the AUMF
including the military-industrial complex, Congress, the President, human rights
advocacy groups, and others, touching the current AUMF will cause a great deal of
political friction. Therefore, policymakers must include these sometimes disparate
interests in their reform calculus.
Equally important in deciding whether to keep, repeal, or replace the current
AUMF is an analysis of how the authorization will allow the United States to protect
itself from current threats. Policymakers should either address how the current or new
AUMF will address emerging or perennial threats to U.S. national security or how other
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defense mechanisms could take over in place of the AUMF. Coverage of new and
emerging threats should factor into the national security calculus to avoid an
authorization from growing obsolete too quickly, as the current AUMF has.
In addition to political feasibility and a consideration of the threat to U.S. national
security, policymakers should consider how closely the new or reformed legislation
aligns with U.S. national interests and core values. At Northwestern University’s School
of Law in March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder articulated this priority: “Just as
surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values. Even when
under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution—
and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law, and our
founding ideals.”144 In crafting new legislation, policymakers should avoid double
standards or contradictions that could undermine U.S. influence or prestige abroad.
Keeping in mind the distinction between war and peace, the new policy should not
perpetuate the forever war. Policymakers should also remain cognizant of how such an
authorization could change future American values or ideas by setting new precedents
and practices.
Policy Options:
a.) Status quo
In exploring options for the future of the AUMF, threats to U.S. national security,
and executive war powers, decision makers must analyze the merits of maintaining the
status quo, which would involve preserving the AUMF in its current form, as a viable
144
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policy option. In terms of political feasibility, preserving the AUMF is popular among
vested interests. For elected officials, the “war on terror” still scores favorable ratings in
public opinion polls, although they are slowly diminishing. According to a February 2014
poll administered by Gallup, 77% of participants ranked international terrorism as a
“critical” threat to vital U.S. interests in the next 10 years.145 In the same poll, just under
half of the participants saw the U.S. military action in Afghanistan as a mistake.146
Though the second figure may seem high, any number less than a majority certainly does
not constitute a large enough constituency to mobilize an effective movement to repeal
the AUMF. Given the general sentiment of the importance of the war on terror, elected
officials may view challenging the status quo as politically risky, and may therefore lack
incentives to try to change the well-entrenched legislation.
Military leaders similarly lack incentives to challenge the AUMF status quo.
Major General Michael Nagata stated that he had “not yet encountered a situation where
there was insufficient legal authority for the combatant commander to execute the
mission or the direction he has been given.”147 Under the AUMF, military commanders
have been granted significant latitude to pursue their targets and execute their mission
objectives. Repealing or replacing the AUMF could mean forfeiting that legal freedom to
operate in the field. Given the vested interests of both political and military actors to
maintain the status quo, the few bills introduced in Congress have gained little traction.
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Preservation of the status quo as a viable policy option is also buoyed somewhat
by the second criterion: addressing U.S. national security. Some may argue that the
AUMF finally grants the president the self-defense powers that the Framers had
envisioned when they provisioned the war powers. Alexander Hamilton explained the
need for an open-ended self-defense mechanism during his advocacy for the Constitution:
The circumstances which may affect the public safety are [not] reducible within
certain determinate limits, . . . it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence
that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense
and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficacy.148
The indeterminate limits of the AUMF have certainly granted, one could argue, the
president the authority to “provide for the defense and protection of the community.”
This line of argument could extend across all realms of the war on terror, including
detention. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on the AUMF to legally
justify the indefinite detention of “enemy combatants.” Therefore, upon the repeal or
replacement of the AUMF, Congress and the president would have to figure out “how to
deal with prisoners of war in the absence of a specific war.”149 With a change in the
status quo, the premature release of potentially dangerous detainees could threaten U.S.
national security.
Intelligence also plays into considerations of U.S. national security. Drone strikes
offer a good example of how classified intelligence could back up the claim that the
AUMF best serves the United States’ national security concerns. Much of the scrutiny
brought down upon the controversial drone strike program, along with the AUMF, comes
148

Delahunty and Yoo, “The President’s Constitutional Authority,” 488.
Michael McAuliff, “AUMF Repeal Bill Would End Extraordinary War Powers Granted After 9/11,”
The Huffington Post, June 10, 2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/10/aumf-repeal-bill-warpowers_n_3416689.html>.
149

53

from a fundamental trust gap between the American people and intelligence agencies or
appointed officials, as opposed to elected officials. Even though no published data exists
on drone strikes, some counterterrorism experts have suggested that CIA tradecraft lends
itself to accurate and reliable drone strikes with the most minimal collateral damage.150
During the Bush Administration’s “war on terror,” Harold Koh, sitting as dean of Yale
Law School, counted among the president’s staunchest critics, even penning an article
entitled “Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?”151 However, Koh seemed to change his
tune after assuming his post as Legal Adviser of the Department of State in 2009. Koh
shifted from the war on terror’s chief critic to its “defender-in-chief.”152 In a 2010
statement, Koh assured the American public, “Our procedures and practices for
identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to
make our targeting even more precise.”153 Setting political explanations for Koh’s change
of heart aside, one explanation could be that, after seeing the intelligence on the targets
covered under the AUMF, Koh felt that the law justified the killings.
But these national security arguments may have held more weight in the few
years following the passage of the AUMF. Since 2001, the AUMF has allowed for the
dismantlement of al Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks on September 11.
However, in today’s shifting threat landscape, the status quo option of keeping the
150
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AUMF fully intact is becoming harder to justify by the national security criterion. In
2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta famously declared that the United States
had “decimated” and “demoralized” core al Qaeda due to the kill and capture of top al
Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden, Shaikh Saeed al-Masri, Atiyah Abd alRahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.154
Despite these decisive victories over al Qaeda, military operations have continued
to expand to meet the evolving threat. In a hearing on the AUMF, Senator John McCain
voiced his concerns over using the AUMF to address these new threats to national
security:
We are now killing people in the Haqqani Network . . . The reason why I bring
that up, we did not even designate the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization
until 2012. And there are published reports, which are not as a result of classified
briefings that I have had, that we have killed people that their direct association
with al Qaeda is tenuous. In fact, there is one story that we killed somebody in
return for the Pakistanis to kill somebody.155
Though threats to national security, specifically from terrorist organizations, continue to
plague the United States, these threats have grown increasingly less connected to al
Qaeda. Because the AUMF does not legally extend to all groups who now threaten the
United States, the national security argument for maintaining the status quo is becoming
obsolete.
The status quo option also falls short when considering the policy criterion of
maintaining U.S. core values and national interests. Because the AUMF has enabled
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significant executive overreach even in pro-executive interpretations of constitutional war
powers, the retention of the AUMF disrupts the balance of power and renders ineffective
the system of checks and balances in U.S. government. Justice Jackson’s noteworthy
concurrence in his 1952 Youngstown decision perfectly describes the stakes involved in
the type of unilateral presidential action enabled by the AUMF:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter . . . Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must
be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system.156
As the AUMF continues to expand presidential war powers, Justice Jackson’s heralded
“equilibrium” slowly disintegrates. Such brash actions taken since the passage of the
AUMF by the executive branch risk to undermine presidential legitimacy at home and
U.S. prestige abroad.
b.) Repealing the AUMF:
Because of the unsustainability and detrimental effects of the AUMF, the
president and Congress should embark on an overhaul of the AUMF and authorization
regime, starting with repealing the law from 2001. Only by first repealing the AUMF can
Congress begin to meaningfully curb executive overreach in the use of military force and
end the state of perpetual war. Although difficult, the political feasibility of repeal is not
impossible; bills to this effect have already been proposed by members of Congress. In
June 2013, Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), a senior member of the Intelligence
Committee, proposed a bill to repeal the AUMF, citing as reasons that al Qaeda had
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largely been degraded and that “Congress never intended and did not authorize a
perpetual war.”157 While recognizing the need for the United States to remain vigilant
against “specific networks of violent extremists,” Rep. Schiff’s proposed bill “urges the
President to work with the legislative branch to secure whatever new authorities may be
required to meet the threat and comply with the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution,
and the law of war.”158 The bill, which called for the repeal of the AUMF effective on
December 31, 2014, won 185 votes in favor.159 Though the bill did not garner enough
votes to pass the House, the affirmative votes signalled at least the beginning of political
support for ending the AUMF’s mandate.
Another boon to the political feasibility of repealing and updating the AUMF is
the existence of many high-profile endorsements for reform. In 2010, John B. Bellinger
III, who served as the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State and the National
Security Council during the Bush administration, penned an op-ed for the Washington
Post, in which he called for Congress to “update and clarify” the “sparsely worded statute
that Congress passed hastily on Sept. 18, 2001, while the wreckage of the World Trade
Center was still smoldering.”160 His main criticism comes from the lack of specificity in
the broadly worded authorization; Bellinger argues that the AUMF does not explicitly
authorize detentions, targeting U.S. citizens, and other activities that the Bush and Obama
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administrations have felt entitled to carry out backed by the authorization. This criticism
and call for repeal carries more weight coming from an insider such as Bellinger.
Transcending political and security considerations, repealing the AUMF is
imperative if Congress and the president hope to uphold U.S. core values. For all of the
problematic aspects of the AUMF, the solution begins with repeal. In terms of restoring
the separation of power and reasserting Congress’ role in war and foreign policy, the
debates leading up to the ultimate repeal of the legislation will force members of
Congress to confront the war on terror both politically and intellectually. This will mark
an important first step for Congress to reclaim its war powers. In terms of the tradeoff
between civil liberties and security, repealing the AUMF will undercut the legal
justifications for extrajudicial detentions and infringements on the privacy of U.S.
citizens. In the absence of the AUMF, the executive branch can no longer claim to carry
out due process for U.S. citizen targets of lethal force.
Rather than only repealing the law, Congress and the president must update the
authorization regime in order to address the current threat landscape. The feasibility of
repealing the AUMF is inextricably linked with highly politicized concerns over
maintaining U.S. national security in the absence of a statutory force authorization. While
perhaps in the minority, some argue that a combination of the president’s Article II
constitutional authority and law enforcement tools offers sufficient authority and
capabilities for the United States to maintain robust national security.161 In their view,
such authority holds even in the absence of the AUMF. This Article II, Section 2
161
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argument, however, tends on the extreme side of pro-Executive interpretations and
perpetuates the trend of Executive overreach. Robert Chesney et al point out a few
shortcomings of a heavy reliance on Article II, Section 2 authority in their article “A
Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats.”162 Due to the demonstrated
protracted nature of the conflict, policymakers should keep in mind changing strategies as
new administrations come to power. Certain administrations might feel more secure
exercising Article II authority than others. Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, it
would be risky to rely on a potentially inconsistent policy in such a high-value item as
national security. Also keeping national security in mind, the president would run into
murky legal water in attempting to detain potentially dangerous criminals without
statutory coverage.163
Should Congress repeal the AUMF, another question arises of whether or not law
enforcement capabilities can sufficiently deal with new and emerging terrorist threats. In
the 2013 Senate hearing on the AUMF, Assistant Secretary Sheehan explained, “Even
prior to the AUMF, we were able to arrest people and try them and bring them back to
the United States with great efficacy prior to September 11.”164 These capabilities, as
Attorney General Holder pointed out in his speech at Northwestern, have only
strengthened through greater cooperation between domestic law enforcement and foreign
intelligence agencies in the post-9/11 United States.165 Additionally, not all situations
require military responses. However, situations have arisen in the past in which the
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president needed statutory authority to prosecute an effective military response. For
example, in 1998, President Clinton struck terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and
Sudan because “law enforcement and diplomatic tools” had proved ineffective in meeting
this national security challenge.166
Given the national security considerations in the absence of a force authorization,
Congress and the executive branch should pursue a comprehensive, pragmatic update of
the authorization regime to address new threats, while still aligning with U.S. core values
and avoiding the troubling legacies of the AUMF. This tact would prove much more
politically feasible than only repealing the AUMF. Future authorizations must take care
to limit the targets, purpose, geographical scope, military resources and methods, and
duration of the conflict.
I.

Actions for Congress
In order to come back into the fold in foreign policy and national security,

Congress must structure a new authorization system to ensure constant consultation with
the president. From the report by Robert Chesney et al at the Hoover Institution,
Congress should adopt aspects of the “general criteria plus listing” recommendation, in
which legislators formalize general statutory criteria by which the president may list
groups or individuals matching the criteria and carry out lethal force against them. Such
criteria could allow an expedited authorization process on organizations “with sufficient
capability and planning that it presents an imminent threat to the United States” or “any
group or person that has committed a belligerent act against the U.S. or imminently
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threatens to do so.”167 While this approach does well to engage Congress and encourage
transparency through the listing process, fully subscribing to this recommendation still
grants the executive too much discretion by allowing the president to choose the
organizations and individuals against whom lethal force is authorized.
One way to sufficiently curb presidential power in the “general criteria plus
listing” approach is to accommodate parts of a bipartisan bill proposed by Senators John
McCain and Tim Kaine called the War Powers Consultation Act of 2014.168 Disheartened
by the often ignored War Powers Resolution, the two senators called for a repeal and
replacement of the 30 year old law. While fully repealing the law may prove unnecessary
or politically difficult, many of the aspects of the bill, developed by the 14-month long
National War Powers Commission, can be incorporated into the updated AUMF.169
While still developing general criteria for terrorist organizations, Congress should follow
the senators’ lead in forming a permanent Joint Congressional Consultation Committee
(JCCC) consisting of majority and ranking members of the committees relating to
national security.170
Instead of immediately employing lethal force after deeming a certain terrorist
organization in accordance with statutory criteria, the president should first meet with the
JCCC after deeming an organization or individual as meeting the criteria (except in cases
of an imminent threat, in which case the president’s Article II emergency powers would
167
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still hold). After meeting with the JCCC, the president may commence with hostilities,
but members of JCCC must take a vote in support or opposition of an expedited
authorization within 30 days. Similarly to the War Powers Resolution, if the president
fails to secure a majority vote, the military action must end after the grace period. Such
an arrangement strikes a balance between the exigencies of war and the need for
congressional consultation.
Even with this approach, perpetuating the “crisis paradigm” and the forever war
should still concern members of Congress. In drafting the new law, legislators must
include a “sunset” provision of a set duration of time after which the entire expedited
authorization system is subjected to review and renewal.171 If Congress fails to renew the
legislation, then the sunset provision would immediately repeal the authorizations. To
assure strict presidential compliance of the new system, something that has eluded the
War Powers Resolution, Congress should include statutory punitive measures, which
would trigger in the event of presidential violation of the updated AUMF. As per the Cato
Institute’s policy recommendation called “Reclaiming the War Power,” Congress should
defund “any such deployment that lacks the prior approval of Congress.”172 As Benjamin
Wittes writes in his blog “Lawfare,” “There are many possible ways for Congress to
authorize and guide the conflict—temporally, geographically, and in terms of the
definition of the enemy.”173 This new authorization system aims to let Congress dictate
each of these conflict areas on a case-by-case basis.
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II.

Actions for the President
Although Congress will drive the lion’s share of AUMF reform, the president

should also take actions to curb executive power in the interests of U.S. national security
and core values. This is not an implausible request. To start reversing the trend of
executive overreach, the Obama administration can make good on some of its promises.
In his landmark speech at the National Defense University in May 2013, President
Obama cautioned against “continu[ing] to grant Presidents unbound powers” while
promising to refuse to sign any “laws designed to expand [the mandate of the AUMF]
further.”174 While containing executive power is a good start, the Obama administration
should also implement measures to roll back those powers.
After leaving his post as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, Harold
Koh delivered his speech “How to End the Forever War?” at the Oxford Union in May
2013, in which he outlined his three part plan to accomplish what his speech title
suggested: “(1) Disengage from Afghanistan, (2) Close Guantanamo, and (3) Discipline
Drones.”175 In these three legacies of the AUMF, President Obama has either made
progress or at least intimated at his desire to comply with Koh’s tenets to end the forever
war. In Afghanistan, the Obama administration has prepared the Pentagon to carry out
full troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.176 Other reports have
suggested that the troop count will drop as low as 10,000 post-2014, the minimum troop
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count recommended by the U.S. Department of Defense.177 These reports, should they
come to fruition, demonstrate a real desire on the Obama administration to begin scaling
back the perpetual war. Guantanamo Bay, on the other hand, represents an area where
Congress has stalled reform. In his 2014 State of the Union Address, President Obama
urged Congress to lift restrictions on detainee transfers in order to close the Guantanamo
Bay detention facility, in order to remain “true to our Constitutional ideals” and set an
example for the rest of the world.178 His recent emphasis shows a renewed effort, as
President Obama has not mentioned the facility in his past four State of the Union
addresses.179 Progress in the disciplining of drone strikes is much more difficult to
discern because of public disclosure issues. However, in his National Defense University
speech, President Obama announced his signing of the “Presidential Policy Guidance,”
which cryptically mentioned a guiding framework for the use of force against
terrorists.180 Because he no longer faces the pressures of reelection, President Obama
should utilize his final years in office to deliver on his campaign promises and end the
limitless mandate of the AUMF.
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Conclusion:
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001
fundamentally changed how Americans viewed the world and lived their everyday life.
Congress and the president reacted to this change by passing the AUMF and forging a
new crisis paradigm for the post-9/11 United States. Since the hazy, frenetic few days
after the passage of the AUMF, the crisis paradigm has allowed the U.S. Armed Forces
and intelligence agencies to dismantle al Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks, and
splinter its terrorist networks. But the war on terror came with heavy costs. Leaving a
trail of unintended consequences, the force authorization eroded civil liberties, allowed
the U.S. government to carry out extrajudicial killings, and transformed the conflict with
al Qaeda into a war without end.
The purpose of this paper is not to analyze whether the ends justified the means.
Some have even argued that the ends are not what they seem, taking into consideration
blowback from drone strikes and the inspiration of emerging radical terrorist groups.
Rather, this paper aims to provide a framework for Congress and the president to
establish a new paradigm, one in which the separation of powers set out by the
Constitution is restored, while still allowing for the United States to remain safe and
secure. The AUMF did not spontaneously materialize; only the decades-long, nefarious
trend of executive overreach could pave the way for such an expansive piece of
legislation. In a meeting with Henry Kissinger in 1961, Harry Truman told the academic,
“If the President knows what he wants, no bureaucrat can stop him. A President has to
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know when to stop taking advice.”181 Future presidents should discard such radical proExecutive ways of thinking, and Congress should hold them accountable. Threats to U.S.
national security are constantly evolving. In responding to those threats, Congress and the
President must take care not to resort to self-cannibalization and do more harm than
good.
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